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Résumé / Abstract 
 
Cet article est en fait l'introduction d'une anthologie (à paraître chez Ashgate) de contributions 
marquantes de l'analyse économique aux stratégies environnementales corporatives. On vise 
donc à intégrer les articles retenus autour de trois pôles : la stratégie corporative, la stratégie 
environnementale, et les questions de mise en œuvre. 
 
Mots clés : économie de la stratégie d'entreprise, économie de l'environnement, 




Résumé anglais This paper is the introduction to a forthcoming  anthology (published by 
Ashgate) of economic contributions to the subject. It ties the articles together, starting with a 
primer on corporate strategy, then considering  corporate environmental strategy, and 
concluding on implementation issues. 
 
Keywords: economics of strategy, environmental economics, implementation of 
strategy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
For at least two decades, in the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez and Bhopal disasters, 
corporations have been facing mounting external and internal pressure to manage 
environmental resources and risks effectively. To address the queries and concerns of 
managers, corporate boards and other stakeholders, codified management, audit and 
reporting schemes have been introduced and implemented, substantial segments of the 
consulting industry and of business school training have turned to identify and convey 
best practices across firms, and a thriving research literature has explored, developed, put 
to scrutiny, and rationalized a rapidly growing body of new ideas. At this point, however, 
there is a need to organize the latter, so that practitioners and researchers can more easily 
appraise it and move on. One way to meet this demand is to write up a unifying survey, a 
task several authors (e.g., Epstein, 1996; Laville, 2002; Lesourd and Schilizzi, 2001; 
Reinhardt, 2000; Schmidheiny, 1992) have already successfully undertaken. A 
worthwhile (complementary) alternative is to single out some of what seem to be key (or 
at least representative) contributions to the field. This route is the one adopted here. 
The articles collected in this book describe some aspects of corporate 
environmental strategy (Part I) or consider related implementation issues (Part II). They 
previously appeared in business policy or in economics journals. Deliberate focus was 
put on these areas, not to play down the numerous valuable insights from the so-called 
functional disciplines of management - accounting, finance, marketing, operational 
research, organizational behaviour, and human resources - but because this book’s main 
theme is the integration of environmental goals with other corporate objectives, and 
business policy is the integrating discipline of corporate management. This theme makes 
up the common thread this introduction will now use to tie the selected articles together. 
 
PART I: The purpose and content of Corporate Environmental Strategy 
 
The objective of this section is to define and locate environmental concerns within the 
realm of corporate strategy. The initial part provides what could be seen as a concise 
primer on the latter (without any pretence of exhaustiveness, of course). It is followed by 
an overview of what corporate environmental strategy currently is or should be.   2
 
I.A Fundamentals 
First, one may ask, generally speaking, what is corporate strategy? Corporate strategy can 
be seen as a framework that allows a given business firm and its embedded business units 
to articulate and coordinate their specific ends and means. Its main goal is to provide the 
corporation’s various stakeholders with a sense of identity and purpose that fosters short- 
term performance and long-term business sustainability.  
Corporate strategy thus begins on two simple questions: What kind of business is 
ours, and what for? To be sure, some answering statements will necessarily boil down to 
the basic profit motive. But current best practices usually go beyond that. As Dave 
Packard, the co-founder of Hewlett-Packard, once said: 
I think many people assume, wrongly, that a company exists simply to make 
money. While this is an important result of a company’s existence, we have 
to go deeper and find the real reasons for our being. As we investigate this, 
we inevitably come to the conclusion that a group of people get together and 
exist as an institution that we call a company so that they are able to 
accomplish something collectively that they could not accomplish separately 
(…). (quoted by Handy, 2002, p. 54; emphasis added)
1 
 
A good corporate strategy has therefore to outline the present and expected realizations of 
a collective, while conveying that the latter is greater than the sum of its parts. 
To be largely endorsed and pursued, collective outcomes – be they some (possibly 
new) services, products, technologies, or simply a significant growth figure – must be 
weighed based on a criterion that is as objective and consensual as possible, and to which 
the firm can commit. A widely shared benchmark is the “value” the business corporation 
can create. It corresponds to the difference between the buyers’ willingness-to-pay for the 
firm’s products or services and the suppliers’ opportunity cost of providing the necessary 
inputs (see, e.g., Brandenberger and Stuart, Chapter 2). In competitive situations, these 
two components of value would come down to the market price of the best alternative the 
firm’s clients and the firm’s suppliers respectively have. 
                                                 
1  This viewpoint, by the way, is consistent with the early “joint-production” theory of the firm initially 
proposed by Alchian and Demsetz (1972), as well as the “cooperative” approach to the firm developed, for 
instance, in Ichiishi (1993).   3
To also get across that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts, emphasis 
must be put on what makes the firm unique and allows it to not only create but also 
capture value. Developed throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the so-called “resource-based 
view of the firm” currently provides the intellectual foundation for this task.
2 A 
prominent concept of this approach is that of “core competencies,” which refer to firm-
specific assets that competitors would find difficult to imitate or acquire, such as some 
outstanding organizational skills in project management, logistics, or manufacturing.
3 Of 
course, these capabilities have to credibly match some real opportunities (Porter, 1996). 
And the foreseeable distribution among stakeholders of the ensuing captured value has to 
make everyone willing to stick to the firm (Ichiishi, 1993). 
To lead to action, finally, a good corporate strategy should bear some concrete 
means of achieving the stated objectives. Such means are in part implicit and amount to 
transmitting a certain corporate culture, thereby providing the specific lenses and 
collective heuristics that the firm’s stakeholders will (often routinely) use to deal with 
complexity and ambiguity in their daily business decisions (Schoemaker, Chapter 6). 
Another helpful contribution is to communicate some insights and call attention on 
particular features of the corporate landscape. This landscape comprises three terrains of 
action (Spulber, Chapter 7): the market, the internal organization, and the public arena. 
Drawing market boundaries brings the firm’s employees and suppliers to focus on 
what the firm does or should be doing, for whom, and how. The exercise, however, 
involves somewhat more subjectivity and judgment than is usually presumed in standard 
economics textbooks (Geroski, 1998). In business, there is usually no single way to 
characterize a market. The main input of a successful corporate strategy is often to 
convey some key market opportunities or features in a creative, refreshing and 
invigorating way. Examples of such mobilising insights include Barnes and Noble’s 
definition of its business as one of selling not only books but also the pleasure of reading 
                                                 
2 The books by Foss (1997) and by Rumelt, Schendel, and Teece (1994) contain some seminal 
contributions to this area. 
 
3  One obstacle to imitation which is inherent in core competencies is that they often generate “causal 
ambiguity” in the eyes of an outsider. This can mean, for instance, that any potential competitor would find 
it impossible to apprehend the recipe for success without entering the industry and undergoing costly 
experimentation. Whether causal ambiguity in this sense truly constitutes an entry barrier was first 
examined by Lippman and Rumelt (Chapter 4).   4
and intellectual exploration, Home Depot’s characterization of its mission as that of 
seeking “(…) to bolster the competence and confidence of customers whose expertise in 
home repairs is limited,” and Starbuck’s vision that coffee may not be just another 
familiar grocery item but also one that is associated with social life, status, and comfort.
4 
Any definition of the firm’s mission and markets usually comes with suggestions 
concerning the enabling organization; for only through an appropriate organization can 
value be created and captured (Rajan and Zingales, 2001). Corporate strategy may not be 
very detailed on this matter and yet indicate quite clearly the sort of hierarchy (steep or 
flat), tasks distribution, and human resource management (recruiting, performance 
evaluation, compensation policies, and career paths) the firm needs. A nice example is 
the statement once made by Jan Carlzon while serving as CEO of Scandinavian Airlines: 
“If you’re not serving the customer, your job is to be serving someone who is.” 
Corporate strategy may finally require reaching out to politicians, government 
agencies, and the public at large. Maintaining a positive corporate image enhances trust 
and goodwill across all stakeholders, thereby lowering the costs of complying with 
existing regulations, hiring and retaining talented employees, building customer and 
supplier loyalty, and attracting investors. To achieve this, corporate strategy can use three 
complementary channels. A common one is the active promotion of business ethics and 
moral codes that go beyond minimal compliance with existing laws and regulations; this 
may actually be an effective mean to overcome biases, counter short-termism, and 
ultimately preserve managerial discretion in decision making (Arrow, Chapter 1; 
Henderson, Chapter 3). Although it deserves strong qualifications, corporate philanthropy 
- which can take the form of donations to non-profit entities seeking to enhance computer 
literacy or to disclose and deter corruption - is also often used to improve the quality of 
the competitive context in which the firm operates (Porter and Kramer, 2002).
5 Last, 
corporate strategy may point out to building constructive business-government 
relationships, often to encourage regulations that would raise the costs of competitors 
                                                 
4 For further discussion of these examples, and for other examples as well, see Kim and Mauborgne (1999). 
 
5 On the current trend to make corporations more transparent and expose unscrupulous business practices, 
see Tapscott and Ticoll (2003). 
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(Salop and Scheffman, Chapter 5), but increasingly to reduce uncertainty or to share and 
coordinate efforts in research and development (Yoffie, Chapter 8). 
This completes our brief account of the main functions and chapters of corporate 
strategy. This subsection began with a quote suggesting that an effective corporate 
strategy should address collective concerns which put the firm’s financial bottom line 
into perspective. Foremost nowadays among these concerns is a company’s management 
of environmental resources. 
 
I.B  Environmental Strategy 
Since the recurrent smog alerts of the 1970s, the major oil spills and industrial accidents 
of the 1980s, and the accumulation of alarming evidence about acid rain, the ozone layer, 
global warming and biodiversity, business corporations have shown increasing awareness 
of environmental issues. 
Clearly, public opinion has been, and still is, a key driver of this outcome. 
Conveying a positive image to an often skeptical public therefore occupies a key part of 
every corporate environmental strategy (Elkington, Chapter 11). Throughout the 1990s, 
the number of corporate environmental reports in the United States has tended to double 
each year (Epstein, 1996). In Japan, the Ministry of the Environment has found that the 
proportion of publicly-traded firms that produced an environmental report went from 
31% to 46% between 1998 and 2000. And according to a KPMG (1999) study, the same 
phenomenon is now taking place, perhaps even more drastically, across Europe. Several 
companies would also signal their concern for the environment through participation in 
government-sponsored voluntary programs (Arora and Cason, Chapter 9). Credible 
signalling can further happen through a firm’s adherence to some non-mandatory 
international standard, such as ISO 14000 or EMAS (the Environmental Management and 
Audit Scheme, which is prevalent in Europe), or industry-wide principles, such as the 
Responsible Care initiative
6 in the chemical industry or the Coalition for Environmentally 
                                                 
6 The Canadian Chemical Producers’ Association was initially responsible for launching the Responsible 
Care initiative in the 1980s. It later came to the US Chemical Manufacturers Association which made it a 
condition of membership. In a nutshell, the Responsible Care Programme stipulates that any chemical firm, 
regardless of where it starts, demonstrate continuous annual improvement in its emissions to air, land, and 
water and be accountable against six criteria: community awareness and emergency response, process   6
Responsible Economies (CERES)
7 in the financial sector. Finally, the use of some 
meaningful and subsequently implemented slogans, such as “Pollution Prevention Pays 
(PPP)” at 3M or “Waste Reduction Always Pays (WRAP)” at Dow Chemical, would 
certainly contribute to reassure a company’s stakeholders. 
  Business firms have also been facing tighter and changing environmental 
regulations. In order to lower compliance costs or draw competitive advantage from 
future legislation, corporate environmental strategy would therefore target the regulatory 
process. According to Avila and Whitehead (1993), for example, Dow Chemical works 
with governments to get pollution prevention instilled in manufacturing instead of 
resorting to end-of-pipe treatment. Substantive industry participation in setting 
environmental standards is also common in many European countries (Porter and van der 
Linde, Chapter 15). 
New environmental regulations have often triggered organizational responses. 
For these regulations typically are result-oriented, thereby giving managers increased 
discretion on how to allocate environmental resources (Bodily and Gabel, Chapter 10). 
Several companies thus went on to create top-level executive positions focusing on 
environmental matters, to promote closed-loop manufacturing, to link together the pursuit 
of environmental quality and a philosophy of “total quality management (TQM),” or to 
encourage the adjustment of internal management procedures and the supply chain in 
order to conserve energy more effectively, deal with waste more efficiently, and enhance 
the traceability of pollutants.  
In many firms, environmental strategy would also mean “greener products.” 
According to some Gallup surveys, more than 75% of consumers say they include 
environmental criteria in their purchasing decisions. Several companies (e.g., 
MacDonald’s, Mobil, etc.) have then seen at their own expense that consumer loyalty 
towards their products depends crucially on perception that these products be 
ecologically benign. Furthermore, regulations which ask manufacturers to take 
                                                                                                                                                 
safety, pollution prevention, secure distribution, employee health and safety, and product stewardship (that 
is, a company’s responsibility for its products throughout their entire life cycle). For an excellent account of 
how this programme was implemented successfully at Dow Chemical, see Avila and Whitehead (1993). 
 
7 CERES mainly regroups institutional investors, particularly pension fund managers. It asks member 
corporations to work towards the sustainable use of natural resources, the reduction or safer disposal of 
waste, the wiser use of energy, and the marketing of safe products and services (see Kleiner, Chapter 13).     7
responsibility for recycling their products are now increasingly enforced in Europe, 
Japan, and North America (Hayes, Chapter 12). Hence, a responsible corporate 
environmental strategy would not only publicize some sporadic demonstrations of 
environmental concern; it would also press for diligent continuous experimentation with 
the life cycles of current products (Kleiner, Chapter 13), looking across product attributes 
in order to deliver the right goods and eventually find lucrative market niches.
8  
In specific industries, notably in the chemical sector, environmental awareness has 
even become a characteristic of corporate identity. At Dow Chemical, for example, the 
environment comes only second among six defining features (after competitiveness, and 
before free and fair trade, education, technology, and corporate credibility); it is also the 
one attracting the largest share of people, managerial time, and money (Avila and 
Whitehead, 1993). 
Despite some clearly emerging best practices, however, corporate environmental 
strategy is still subject to questionable discrepancies across firms. Such differences 
primarily concern the level of integration of environmental issues into regular business 
activities. Some firms’ environmental strategy remains only an element (albeit a major 
one) of corporate public relations, while other firms are making every effort to get all 
business units involved in environmental goal-setting and implementation. The matter 
essentially boils down to whether stronger and deeper environmental awareness can 
ultimately shape a firm’s core competencies and systematically create value (all other 
things remaining equal). Most economists would argue that the answer to the latter is 
negative (Palmer, Oates, and Portney, Chapter 14). But a large number of case studies 
suggest otherwise: committing to stricter environmental objectives can reduce 
uncertainty, overcome organizational inertia, mitigate agency problems, and foster 
creative thinking (Porter and van der Linde, Chapter 15).
9 Zero-waste approaches, for 
                                                 
8  For example, Kim and Mauborgne (1999) report that, looking through the entire life cycle of light bulbs, 
“(…) Philips came to understand that the price and life of bulbs did not account for the full cost of lighting. 
Because lamps contained environmentally toxic mercury, companies faced high disposal costs at the end of 
a lamp’s life. (…) So in 1995, Philips introduced the Alto, an environmentally friendly bulb (…). The new 
market Alto created has superior margins and is growing rapidly; the product has already replaced more 
than 25% of traditional fluorescent lamps used in stores, schools, and office buildings in the United States.” 
9 According to the so-called “Porter hypothesis,” smarter environmental regulation would render such a 
commitment possible. 
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instance, can stimulate organizational learning, because waste and emissions often carry 
important information about flaws in product design or the production process. At 
Interface Corporation - a leading maker of materials for commercial interiors, Chairman 
Ray C. Davis once defined waste as “any measurable input that does not produce 
customer value,” and he accordingly considered all inputs to be waste unless shown 
otherwise; the upshot was a treasure hunt that, between 1994 and 1998, kept resource 
inputs constant while raising revenues by $200 million. Whole-system thinking, more 
generally, can lead to identify and make small corrections that have considerable 
repercussions. In an experiment at its Swiss headquarters, for example, Dow Europe cut 
office paper flow by about 30% simply by discouraging unneeded information; this and 
other small steps ended up raising labor productivity, because managers could then 
concentrate on what they really needed to read. Shifting business model, finally, can set 
the firm on a rewarding path, especially if it allows to capture consumers’ savings on 
ecosystem services. So did Dow Chemical and Safety-Kleen when they chose to lease 
dissolving services instead of selling solvents; this strategy entailed significant cost 
reductions, since it permitted reusing the same solvent a large number of times.
10 
Such success stories have been widely publicized. It is therefore unsurprising that, 
according to a survey by the consulting firm Arthur D. Little, 83% of CEOs and board 
members believe they can create value from implementing a sustainable-development 
approach to corporate strategy. This enthusiasm usually fades away after unexpected 
costs arise or anticipated benefits fail to materialize. “Talk is cheap; environmental 
efforts are not.” (Walley and Whitehead, Chapter 21) And firm leaders still lack some 
implementation guidelines that would allow them to turn their good intentions into 
reality. The collection of articles in the second part of this book is meant to fill this gap. 
   
PART II: Implementation issues 
 
Pursuing an ambitious environmental strategy raises a wealth of issues, from the shop 
floor to corporate headquarters, from procurement units to logistics to the sales force. Of 
course, corporate boards and top executives are not expected to address every subject in 
                                                 
10 The examples of this paragraph, and many examples of this sort, can be found and are commented further 
in Lovins, Lovins and Hawken (1999).     9
full details; their role is rather to ensure that concerns can be dealt with effectively. In this 
respect, an important generic matter to be taken into account is that asking managers to 
further deliver on environmental issues calls for an expansion of their respective 
agendas. The articles collected in the second part of this book study the ramifications of 
this for organizational design, incentives, governance and leadership. These articles are 
sometimes mathematically demanding. However, the non-specialist could skip the formal 
arguments without missing the main conclusions.
11 
 
II.A Organizational design 
 
Serious environmental programs can be broad and complex, thereby exposing managers 
to informational overload. In this context, net returns to managerial effort will decrease 
rapidly, and the fate of the firm might end up resting on dangerous but time-saving rules-
of-thumb and routines, misleading but convenient heuristics, and deficient but cosmetic 
problem solving.
12 
A natural way to cope with complexity is to introduce a partition of tasks and 
some division of labor. The advantages of making people concentrate on different 
complementary components of a complex product or process are well-known since at 
least Adam Smith: in so doing, workers acquire better skills more quickly, execute their 
job faster, and are more prone to innovate. On the other hand, the greater the 
specialization, the more difficult it becomes to coordinate the actions of everyone. The 
challenge of organizational design is precisely to balance the gains from specialization 
with the ensuing costs of information processing and communication. 
                                                 
11 The texts by Milgrom and Roberts (1992), and Rubin (1990) constitute excellent analytical surveys of the 
generic means a corporation has to run its strategy. Some reviews of applications to the problem of 
implementing an environmental strategy include Gabel and Sinclair-Desgagné (2000), Sinclair-Desgagné 
and Vachon (2000), and Sinclair-Desgagné (2001). 
 
12 Corbett and Van Wassenhove (Chapter 17) provide an overview of various environmental programs 
(such as “limiting pollution”), and discuss some possible effort-saving analogies with already existing, and 
complex, management approaches (such as “production planning with capacity constraints”). Walley and 
Whitehead (Chapter 21), however, illustrate the large expenses that the implementation of an 
environmental strategy often entails; and DeCanio (Chapter 18) compellingly argues that individuals’ 
cognitive limitations combined with organizational lacunae can put the outcome of an environmental 
program at risk.   10
This tradeoff is analyzed by Bolton and Dewatripont (Chapter 16). They uncover 
two important organizing principles: (i) a manager who is not overloaded should avoid 
delegating items to subordinates, and (ii) when delegation must occur, a manager’s data 
should be sent to only one other agent (in order to avoid duplication). It follows that 
efficient organizations are pyramidal: a manager in some layer l (= 0,1,…,L-1) sends 
messages to just one supervisor in layer l  + 1, and receives items only from agents 
located in layer l – 1 (the latter case, of course, if l > 0). 
  Yet, all rearrangements that seek to make an organization more effective in 
handling information are subject to several caveats. Radner’s article (Chapter 19), for 
instance, warns that the number of necessary managers must remain proportional to the 
quantity of items to be processed per unit of time, and that delays in information 
processing would grow with the number of submitted data items. More precisely, let N 
denote the number of new data items that need to be treated every T units of time, C the 
delay in processing information, and P the number “processors,” it can be shown that the 
size and delays of an efficient organization are subject to the following lower bounds:
13 
P > N / T 
C > 1 + log2 N . 
Furthermore, as shown by Sah and Stiglitz (Chapter 20), the somewhat greater 
centralization inherent in pyramidal structures entails more variability in the quality of 
managers. The reason is that, when they run a centralized organization, highly capable 
decision-makers have a larger positive impact, but highly incapable managers have a 
greater negative effect as well when they reach a similar position.
14 
  Most practical accounts of organizational design would conclude, finally, that the 
success of a given structure depends also crucially on the induced managerial incentives.  
II.B Incentives 
 
The subject of incentives is by far the most studied by economists. The more the better, 
indeed, since the common diagnostic when a firm displays poor environmental 
                                                 
13  A mathematical proof is given by Radner (Chapter 19). Note that the logarithm in the second inequality 
suggests that delays might nevertheless increase at a decreasing rate. 
  
14 Of course, much more can be said about the fallibility of alternative organizational forms, such as 
committees and polyarchies.  The interested reader may look at Sah (1991) for an overview.   11
performance is that managerial incentives were inadequate (see, for instance, DeCanio, 
Chapter 18; and Lovins et al., 1999). 
The basic framework used by economists to study incentives is the principal-agent 
model.
15 In this context, Gabel and Sinclair-Desgagné (Chapter 25) first pointed out that 
implementing an environmental strategy means that the firm’s principals would now add 
to their subordinates’ regular business duties the task of dealing with environmental 
matters. This so-called multi-tasking representation bears two important, but pessimistic, 
conclusions about the incentive system that would normally follow. First, if the new 
corporate demands pull managerial effort to its physical limit, then it may not be wise to 
link an employee’s compensation to environmental results (Gabel and Sinclair-Desgagné, 
Chapter 25).
16 Second, even when the physical constraints on managerial effort are not 
binding, the relative imprecision of environmental performance appraisal in the short-run 
makes it less desirable to provide strong incentives on the regular business tasks 
(Holmstrom and Milgrom, Chapter 24).
17 Conforming to the latter, however, would 
undoubtedly have a depressing effect on a firm’s competitiveness. 
To avoid this dilemma, Holmstrom and Milgrom (Chapter 24) recommend that 
environmental and standard business tasks be assigned to different people. Current 
production technology and business processes, however, may not allow such a 
specialization. Besides, someone at some point (e.g., the corporate CEO) must always 
take charge of environmental as well as standard business matters. In this case, the 
scheme proposed by Sinclair-Desgagné (Chapter 26) might constitute a suitable remedy. 
                                                 
15 For a thorough presentation of this model and its implications for various functional disciplines of 
management, such as finance, marketing, organizational behaviour, and human resources, see Milgrom and 
Roberts (1992). 
 
16  Yet, several firms have already adopted some form of incentive schemes based on environmental 
outcomes. According to Avila and Whitehead (1993), for example, Dow Chemical’s performance 
improvement review has a number of elements - among which environmental performance - built into its 
process, bonus system and incentive pay for employees. Whether such a scheme is optimal is another 
question.  
  
17 Chapter 24 spells out a compelling rationale for this statement, which can be sketched as follows. 
Because of the difficulty of measuring environmental performance in the short-run and of relating it 
somewhat accurately to a manager’s effort, bonuses and contingent rewards should depend little on 
environmental appraisals. In this situation, however, if incentives on regular business tasks were to remain 
strong, then managerial attention would naturally keep focusing on these tasks at the expense of 
environmental concerns.   12
This scheme operates as follows. Let A refer to some regular business assignment and B 
denote the additional environmental task. The output in A is routinely monitored, but an 
evaluation of performance in the environmental task B happens only after observing 
sufficient output in regular business assignments (the intuitive justification being that this 
output level might have been achieved while neglecting task B). An evaluation that 
reveals an apparent disregard for the environmental task will then trigger a penalty; yet, 
the incentives associated with task B are set so that, ex ante, the agent would wish an 
assessment of environmental performance to take place. Under this system of rewarding 
contingent appraisals, standard business and environmental tasks become complementary 
from the agent’s viewpoint, so strong incentives to work on one side will not drive effort 
away from the other side. On the contrary, a manager complying with standard business 
goals will often be subject to an environmental evaluation and would therefore be well-
advised to also carry out the firm’s environmental plan; and a manager who cares about 
the environment could only get some retribution after also putting enough attention into 
regular business in order to trigger an environmental appraisal. 
Another way to overcome the dilution of incentives that the introduction of 
environmental considerations seems to bring about is to harness the managers’ career 
concerns.
18 Managers not only seek short-term pecuniary benefits; they also worry about 
long-term career prospects. The latter is linked to their professional reputation, which 
may improve or deteriorate depending on previous achievements in key aspects of their 
job. Managers may therefore not react negatively to a dampening of their usual incentive 
pay, provided they are convinced that dealing properly with environmental issues is 
something business corporations keep track of, and value. 
Keeping records of some top executive’s environmental results, however, might 
be done more effectively and credibly when it is exposed to the scrutiny of several active 
stakeholders (which may include the firm’s shareholders, of course, as well as its 
employees, customers, suppliers, lenders, and local neighbors). This currently constitutes 
a major investigation topic for governance scholars and practitioners.  
                                                 
18  The best and most up-to-date introduction to the economic analysis of career concerns is the sequence of 
articles by Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole, which are reproduced as Chapters 22 and 23 in this book. 
Chapter 22 provides the foundation of such an analysis and may be skipped by the non-technical reader. 
The other chapter presents a meaningful application to government agencies (and, by extension, to large 




To convey its environmental strategy to managers, a corporation might choose to 
explicitly involve some interested parties. This raises a number of governance issues. 
Koehler and Chang (Chapter 28), for instance, emphasize the growing practice of 
corporate environmental disclosures. The quality of the environmental information that 
would be voluntarily disclosed to a veto-empowered stakeholder by a business firm is 
next considered by Sinclair-Desgagné and Gozlan (Chapter 31). After casting this 
situation into a game-theoretic model, they find that the disclosed environmental data 
would be most abundant and precise when the stakeholder worries about environmental 
risks, the cost of producing environmental figures is low, and a responsible firm is able 
and willing to set itself apart by delivering more accurate information. Whether this case 
occurs or not depends in particular on public policies affecting the stakeholder’s a priori 
beliefs and cost of dealing with (often intricate) environmental information. 
The fact that good environmental management usually requires contributions from 
a whole chain of people also brings about measurement problems. In Chapter 29, Meyer 
points out that most output-based measures remain centered on what goes on within a 
function rather than on what happens across functions.
19 His proposal is to empower the 
entire set of participants to a given process, so they can best create (holistic) measures to 
track that process. Life-cycle analysis - a technique seeking to capture all the 
environmental impacts of a product, from the extraction of its basic inputs to its disposal 
or recycling - might constitute a helpful framework for this endeavour. 
Once appropriate measures are defined, they could be used to prepare disclosures, 
for continuous improvement of products and processes, to design internal markets which 
internalize environmental externalities (e.g., via suitable transfer prices), and to support 
external or internal environmental audits. The mode in which the right measure is 
                                                 
19 To fulfill their environmental strategy, several firms have recently undergone significant reforms of their 
accounting processes (see Porter and van der Linde, Chapter 15), switching to “full cost accounting,” which 
attempts to assign all costs to specific product or processes, up to “total cost accounting,” which further 
includes cost items beyond traditional concerns, such as indirect or hidden costs (e.g., compliance costs, 
insurance, on-site waste management, operation of pollution control, and future liability) and less tangible 
benefits (like revenue from enhanced company image). Despite all of this, however, Meyer’s criticism still 
seems to hold.   14
applied, however, has to be carefully set; otherwise the firm could still get disappointing 
results. Concerning environmental audits, for example, Sinclair-Desgagné and Gabel 
(Chapter 30) stress that they should rather be contingent on what happens in tasks that 
compete for managerial attention, instead of simply occurring at fixed or random times. 
The active involvement of stakeholders with possibly conflicting interests finally 
poses another difficult governance challenge. From an executive’s viewpoint, each 
stakeholder may constitute a real principal, entitled to have a say in job design, 
supervision and compensation. This creates what is called a “common agency.” In this 
situation, a significant caveat is then a systematic decrease in the power of incentives 
(Tirole, Chapter 32). In Holmstrom and Milgrom (Chapter 24)’s multi-tasking context, 
for instance, such a decrease would be proportional to the number of actual principals 





The matter of leadership always comes to a corporate executive’s mind when it is time to 
implement a new strategy.
20 There is accordingly a huge literature on the subject in the 
fields of management, human resources, and organizational behaviour.
21 Yet, economists 
have so far devoted little attention to it. 
  A notable exception is the article by Benjamin Hermalin, which is reprinted in 
Chapter 33. This paper captures one important feature of leadership: the fact that a leader 
is by definition someone whom several people are willing to follow without being forced 
(or paid). This can happen, even among rational agents who can foresee each other’s 
opportunistic behavior, when the candidate to leadership spends enough energy towards a 
stated collective goal to convince others that this end must be worth pursuing. This sort of 
“leadership by example” - some would call it emulation - can certainly substitute for 
costly communication. 
                                                 
20 Consider, for instance, the following testimony by Dow Chemical’s CEO and Chairman Frank Popoff: 
“What happened at Dow was that after we recognized the environment as an issue and went through the 
continuum of denial, data, dialogue, and delivery, we finally saw that we needed to give the whole thing 
leadership.” (quoted by Avila and Whitehead (1993), p. 58) 
  
21 For a literature survey, see Blais and Sinclair-Desgagné (2002).   15
More generally, good leadership allows to economize on planning, structure, and 
control. One reason might be that it harnesses the intrinsic motivation of individuals 
rather than relying on explicit contracts: people then derive satisfaction from endorsing 
and working along their leader per se, and not just from the possibility of ever getting 
some rewards or escaping some penalties.
22 Leadership thus seems indispensable to 
successfully implement a corporate environmental strategy, as the basic arguments 
underlying such a strategy often appeal not to people’s greed or fear but to their sense of 




In a public lecture broadcast on BBC radio in 2000, John Browne, the CEO of oil giant 
British Petroleum, asserted that “the business community is not in opposition to 
sustainable development but is in fact essential to delivering sustainability, because only 
business can produce the technological innovations and deliver the means for genuine 
progress on this front.”
23 Statements like this motivate a careful study of the nature, 
scope, and implementation of corporate environmental strategy. 
The articles collected in this book represent some significant advances in this 
direction. They certainly do not provide the last word on the issues they respectively 
address (particularly the implementation issues). Hopefully, they will draw still more 
attention and generate much needed insights on this important topic. 
                                                 
22  The issue of intrinsic motivation also came only recently on the agenda of economic researchers.  One 
first significant account is the article by Kreps (1997). The relationship between intrinsic motivation and 
leadership still needs to be articulated. 
   
23  Quoted in Handy (2002), p. 53.   16
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